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Abstract. The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generaliza-
tion of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite
assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying
capacities) that is “stable” based on a set of underlying preference lists
submitted by the jobs and machines. Building on the initial work of [6],
we study a natural “unsplittable” variant of this problem, where each as-
signed job must be fully assigned to a single machine. Such unsplittable
bipartite assignment problems generally tend to be NP-hard, including
previously-proposed variants of the unsplittable stable allocation prob-
lem [13]. Our main result is to show that under an alternative model
of stability, the unsplittable stable allocation problem becomes solvable
in polynomial time; although this model is less likely to admit feasible
solutions than the model proposed in [13], we show that in the event
there is no feasible solution, our approach computes a solution of mini-
mal total congestion (overfilling of all machines collectively beyond their
capacities). We also describe a technique for rounding the solution of a
stable allocation problem to produce “relaxed” unsplit solutions that are
only mildly infeasible, where each machine is overcongested by at most
a single job.
1 Introduction
Consider a bipartite assignment problem over a graph G = (V = J ∪ M, E)
involving the assignment of a set of jobs J to a set of machines M . Each job
j ∈ J has a processing time q(j), each machine m ∈ M has a capacity q(m),
and there is a capacity c(jm) for each edge jm ∈ E governing the maximum
amount of job j that can be assigned to machine m. A feasible assignment of
jobs to machines is described by a function x : E → R≥0 such that
1. 0 ≤ x(jm) ≤ c(jm) for all edges jm ∈ E,
2. x(j) :=
∑
m∈M x(jm) ≤ q(j) for all jobs j ∈ J , and
3. x(m) :=
∑
j∈J x(jm) ≤ q(m) for all machines m ∈ M .
If x(jm) ∈ {0, q(j)} for all jm ∈ E, we say the assignment is unsplit, since each
assigned job is assigned in its entirety to a single machine. We often forgo the
use of edge capacities c(jm) when discussing unsplit assignments, since an edge
jm can simply be deleted if c(jm) < q(j).
Problems of the form above have been extensively studied in the algorithmic
literature, where typical objectives are to find a feasible assignment or one of
maximum weight (maximizing a linear objective function
∑
jm∈E w(jm)x(jm),
where w(jm) is the weight of edge jm ∈ E). While the fractional (splittable)
variants of these problems are easy to solve in polynomial time via network flow
techniques, the unsplittable variants are somewhat more interesting. In linear
time, one can greedily assign jobs arbitrarily to machines until no further as-
signments are possible, thereby producing a maximal assignment. However, if
we care about finding an unsplit assignment of measurably good quality, the
problem becomes substantially harder. It is NP-hard to find an unsplit assign-
ment of either maximum total size |x| =
∑
jm∈E x(jm) or of maximum weight;
the former is a variant of the multiple subset sum problem [4], and the latter is
known as the multiple knapsack problem [5].
In contrast to problems with explicit edge costs, the stable allocation problem
is an “ordinal” problem variant where the quality of an assignment is expressed
in a more game theoretic setting via ranked preference lists submitted by the
jobs and machines, with respect to which we seek an assignment that is stable
(defined shortly). In this paper, we study the stable allocation problem in the
unsplittable setting, which was shown to be NP-hard in [13] using one natural
definition for stability. We show here that by contrast, a different and more strict
notion of stability, proposed initially in [6], leads to an O(|E|) algorithm for the
unsplit problem. The tradeoff is that under this different notion of stability, it is
unlikely that feasible solutions will exist. However, we show that by relaxing the
problem to allow mildly infeasible solutions, our algorithm computes a “relaxed”
unsplit stable solution (in which each machine is filled beyond its capacity by at
most the allocation of a single job) in which the total amount of overcongestion
across all machines,
∑
m∈M max (0, x(m)− q(m)), is minimized (so in particular,
if there is a feasible solution with no congestion, we will find it).
Through the work of several former authors [8,18,17], the “relaxed” model
has become relatively popular in the context of unsplittable bipartite assignment
and unsplittable flow problems. The standard approximation algorithm frame-
work (finding an approximately-optimal, feasible solution) typically does not fit
these problems, since finding any feasible solution is typically NP-hard. Instead,
authors tend to focus on pseudo-approximation results with minimal congestion
per machine or per edge. Analogous results were previously developed for un-
split stable allocation problems in [6], where an unsplit stable allocation can be
found in linear time in which each machine is overcongested by at most a single
job. The model of stability proposed in [6] is the one we further develop in this
paper, and among all of these prior approaches (including those for standard
unsplittable bipartite assignment and flows), it seems to be the only unsplit
model studied to date in which minimization of total congestion is possible in
polynomial time. Hence, there is a substantial algorithmic incentive to consider
this model, even though its notion of stability is less natural than in [13].
In our “relaxed” unsplit model, we develop new structural and algorithmic
results by showing how to compute in O(|E|) time a “job-optimal” assignment
that maximizes the total size |x| of all assigned jobs, and a “machine-optimal”
assignment that minimizes |x|. It is this machine-optimal solution that we show
also minimizes total congestion. In order to produce potentially other solutions
(e.g., that might be more fair to both sides), we show also a technique for “round-
ing” a solution of the fractional stable allocation problem to obtain a relaxed
unsplit solution. Finally, we comment on several mathematical properties of the
set of all relaxed unsplit solutions, showing that while they unfortunately seem
to lack the nice distributed lattice structure satisfied by solutions of the stable
matching and allocation problems, they do at least adhere to a weakened form
of the so-called “rural hospital” theorem, defined shortly.
2 Background and Preliminaries
2.1 Stable Matching and Allocation Problems
Stable Marriage. The stable marriage (or stable matching) problem takes place
on a bipartite graph with men on one side and women on the other, where each
individual submits a strictly-ordered, but possibly incomplete preference list of
the members of the opposite sex. The goal is to find a matching that is stable,
containing no blocking pair – an unmatched (man, woman) pair (m, w) where m
is either unmatched or prefers w to his current partner, and likewise for w.
In their seminal paper [10], Gale and Shapley describe a simple O(|E|) al-
gorithm to find a stable matching for any instance. The most typical incarna-
tion of their algorithm generates a solution that is “man-optimal” and “woman-
pessimal”, where each man is matched with the best possible partner he could
receive in any stable matching, and each woman is matched with the worst pos-
sible partner she could receive in any stable matching. By reversing the roles of
the men and women, the algorithm can also generate a solution that is simulta-
neously woman-optimal and man-pessimal.
Stable Allocation. The stable allocation problem was introduced by Baïou and
Balinski [1] as a high-multiplicity variant of the stable matching problem, where
we match non-unit elements with non-unit elements – here, we speak of matching
jobs of varying size with machines of varying capacity. Just as before, jobs and
machines submit strict preferences over their outgoing edges in the bipartite
assignment graph. If job j ∈ J prefers machine m1 ∈ M to machine m2 ∈ M , we
write rankj(jm1) > rankj(jm2). A stable allocation in this setting is a feasible
allocation (as defined in the introduction) where for every edge jm ∈ E with
x(jm) < c(jm), either j is fully assigned to machines at least as good as m,
or m is fully assigned to jobs at least as good as j. That is, there can be no
blocking edge jm where x(jm) < c(jm) and both j and m would prefer use
more of this edge. For sake of simplicity, we say that edges with positive x value
are in x. Machines with x(m) = q(m) are saturated. Later, when x(m) > q(m)
occurs in the relaxed version of the problem, we talk about over-capacitated
machines. If any job prefers machine m to any of its allocated machines, then
m is called popular, otherwise m is unpopular. Note that all popular machines
must be saturated in any stable allocation.
The stable allocation problem can be solved in O(|E| log |V |) time [7]. There
can be many different solutions for the same instance, but they all have the same
total allocation |x|, and even stronger, the values of x(j) and x(m) for each job
and machine remain unchanged across all stable allocations. This holds for both
stable marriage and stable allocation, moreover, even for stable roommate, the
non-bipartite version of the problem, and is known as the rural hospital theorem.
A common application of stable matching in practice is the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP), where medical school graduates in the USA are
matched with residency positions at hospitals via a centralized stable matching
procedure. A consequence of the rural hospital theorem is that if a less-preferred
(typically rural) hospital cannot fill its quota in some stable assignment, then
there is no stable assignment in which its quota will be filled.
Like the stable marriage problem, one can always find job-optimal, machine-
pessimal and job-pessimal, machine-optimal solutions. To define these notions
for the stable allocation problem, Baïou and Balinski [1] define an order on
stable solutions based on a min-min criterion, where a job j prefers allocation
x1 to allocation x2 if x1(jm) < x2(jm) implies x1(jm′) = 0 for every jm′ worse
than jm for j. A similar relation can be defined for machines as well. Stable
matchings [12] and stable allocations [1] both form distributive lattices with an
ordering relation based on the min-min criterion.
2.2 Unsplittable Stable Allocation Problems
An unsplit allocation x satisfies x(jm) ∈ {0, q(j)} for all jm ∈ E, so each job is
assigned in its entirety to one machine. For simplicity, we introduce a “dummy”
machine md with high capacity, which acts as the last choice for every job. This
lets us assume without loss of generality that an unsplittable assignment always
exists in which every job is assigned. In this context, we define the size |x| of an
assignment so that jobs assigned to md do not count, since they are in reality
unassigned. In addition to the application of scheduling jobs in a non-preemptive
fashion, a motivating application for the unsplittable stable allocation problem is
in assigning personnel with “two-body” constraints. For example, in the NRMP,
a married pair of medical school graduates might act as an unsplittable entity
of size 2 (this particular application has been studied in substantial detail in the
literature [2,3,14,15]).
From an algorithmic standpoint, one of the main results of this paper is that
how we define stability in the unsplit case seems quite important. In [13], the
following natural definition was proposed: an edge jm is blocking if j prefers m
to its current partner, and if m prefers j over q(j) units of its current allocation.
Unfortunately, it was shown in [13] that this definition makes the computation
of an unsplit stable assignment NP-hard. We therefore consider an alternate,
stricter notion of stability where edge jm is blocking if j prefers m to its current
partner, and if m prefers j over any amount of its current allocation. That is,
if j would prefer to be assigned to m over its current partner, than m must be
saturated with jobs m prefers to j. As in the splittable case, popular machines
must therefore be saturated. Practice shows [16] that if a hospital is willing to
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Fig. 1. This instance admits an unsplit assignment, but the unique stable
allocation is fractional.
hire one person in a couple, but it has no free job opening for the partner, it is
most likely amenable to make room for both applicants. Therefore, our definition
of a blocking pair serves practical purposes.
The existence of an unsplit stable allocation cannot be guaranteed. A simple
instance where the unique stable allocation is fractional is shown in Figure 1.
The quota of each job and machine is displayed next to the vertex, while the
preference lists are displayed on the edges.
Relaxed Unsplit Assignments. The downside of our alternate definition of
stability is that it is unlikely to allow feasible unsplit stable allocations to exist
in most large instances. Therefore, we consider allowing mildly-infeasible solu-
tions where each machine can be over-capacitated by a single job – a model
popularized by previous results in the approximation algorithm literature for
standard unsplittable assignment problems [8,18,17], and introduced in the con-
text of unsplittable stable allocation by Dean et al. [6]. Specifically, we say x is
a relaxed unsplit assignment if x(jm) ∈ {0, q(j)} for every edge jm ∈ E, and
if for each machine m, removal of the least-preferred job assigned to m would
cause x(m) < q(m)3. Our definition of stability extends easily naturally to the
relaxed setting: we say a relaxed unsplit assignment x is stable if for every edge
jm with x(jm) = 0, either j is assigned to a machine j prefers to m, or m’s
quota is filled or exceeded with jobs m prefers to j. Otherwise, if edge jm with
x(jm) = 0 is preferred by j to its allocated machine and m’s quota is not filled
up with better edges than jm, then jm blocks x.
Note that the relaxed unsplit model differs from the non-relaxed unsplit
model with capacities inflated by max q(j), since stability is still defined with
respect to the original capacities. It may be best to regard “capacities” in this
setting as constraints governing start time, rather than completion time of jobs,
since a machine below its capacity is always willing to launch a new job, irre-
spective of job size. Similarly, a machine m views an edge jm as blocking if the
machine is not fully saturated with jobs m prefers to jm, as in this case m is
3 The model introduced in [6] allows x(m) ≤ q(m), but we believe strict inequality
is actually a better choice – for mathematical reasons as well as from a modeling
standpoint. For example, the old definition applied to a hospital-resident matching
scenario with married couples might cause a hospital to accept two more residents
than its quota, while the new definition would only require accepting one more
resident. All of the results in [6] hold with either definition.
willing to accept jm. The “capacity” of a machine therefore reflects the cutoff
at which it feels content to receive additional assignment versus when it can no
longer accept additional load.
3 Machine-Optimal Relaxed Unsplit Assignments
In [6], a version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is described to find the job-optimal
relaxed unsplit stable assignment xjopt. In this context, job-optimal means that
there is no relaxed unsplit stable assignment x′ such that any job is assigned to
a better machine in x′ than in xjopt. The implementation described in [6] runs in
O(|E| log |V |) time, but O(|E|) is also easy to achieve. In this section, we show
how to define and compute a machine-optimal relaxed unsplit stable allocation
xmopt also in O(|E|) time, and we prove the following:
Theorem 1. Among all relaxed unsplit stable allocations x, |x| is maximized at
x = xjopt and minimized at x = xmopt.
One of the main challenges with computing a machine-optimal assignment
is defining machine-optimality. In the stable allocation problem, existence of a
machine-optimal solution follows from the fact that all stable solutions form a
distributive lattice under the standard min-min ordering relationship introduced
in [1]. However, this ordering seems to depend crucially on the existence of a rural
hospital theorem, which no longer holds in the relaxed unsplit case, since relaxed
unsplit stable assignments may differ in cardinality, as shown in the upper-left
example in Figure 2. The dashed edges form a stable solution of size 3, while the
remaining edges build another stable solution of size 6. Even an appropriately
relaxed version of the rural hospital theorem seems difficult to formulate over
relaxed instances: machines can be saturated or even over-capacitated in one
relaxed unsplit stable solution, while being empty in another one. The lower-
left example in the figure shows such an instance: the two stable assignments
are denoted with the same line types, and m1 is the machine that has different
positions in them. Nonetheless, we can still prove a result in the spirit of the
rural hospital theorem, which we discuss further in Section 3.3.
Without an “exact” rural hospital theorem, comparing two allocations using
the original min-min ordering seems problematic, and indeed one can construct
instances where two relaxed unsplit stable solutions are incomparable according
to this criterion. For example, the instance on the right in Figure 2 shows two
relaxed unsplit solutions (indicated with dotted and solid edges) that are incom-
parable for machine m3. We therefore adopt a different but nonetheless natural
ordering relation: lexicographical order. We say that machine m prefers unsplit
allocation x1 to allocation x2 if the best edge in x1△x2 belongs to x1, where
△ denotes the symmetric difference operation. The opposite ordering relation is
based on the position of jobs, and since jobs are always assigned to machines in
an unsplit fashion, the lexicographic and min-min relations are actually the same
from the job’s perspectives; hence, “job optimal” means the same thing under
both. The lexicographical position of the same agent in different allocations can
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Fig. 2. The upper-left instance admits two relaxed unsplit solutions dif-
fering in cardinality. The lower-left example is evidence against a rural
hospital theorem. The graph in the middle shows two incomparable re-
laxed unsplit solutions. The last instance is a counterexample showing
the difficulty of formulating join and meet operations. The first and third
graphs illustrate instances of NRMP.
always be compared, and we say a relaxed stable solution x is machine-optimal
if it is at least as good for all machines as any other relaxed stable assignment
(although we still need to show that such a solution always exists).
3.1 The Reversed Gale-Shapley Algorithm
For the classical stable marriage problem, the Gale-Shapley algorithm can be re-
versed easily, with women proposing instead of men, to obtain a woman-optimal
solution. We show that this idea can be generalized (carefully accounting for
multiple assignment and congestion among machines) to compute a machine-
optimal relaxed unsplit stable assignment. Pseudocode for the algorithm appears
in Figure 3.
1: x(jmd) := q(j) for all j ∈ J , x(jm) := 0 for every other jm ∈ E
2: while ∃m : x(m) < q(m) with a non-empty preference list do
3: m proposes to its best job j with q(j)
4: if j prefers m to its current partner then
5: x(jm) := q(j)
6: x(jm′) := 0 for ∀m′ 6= m
7: end if
8: delete j from m’s preference list
9: end while
Fig. 3. Reversed relaxed unsplit Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Claim. The algorithm terminates in O(|E|) time.
Proof. In each step, a job is deleted from a machine’s preference list.
Claim. The algorithm produces an allocation x that is a relaxed unsplit stable
assignment.
Proof. First, we check the three feasibility constraints for x. Since proposals
are always made with q(j) and refusals are always full rejections, the quota
constraints of the jobs may not be violated. Moreover, each job is assigned to
exactly one machine. Machines can be over-capacitated, but deleting the worst
job from their preference list results in an allocation under their quota. Otherwise
the machine would not have proposed along the last edge.
If x is unstable, then there is an empty edge jm blocking x. During the
execution, m must have proposed to j. This offer was rejected, because j already
had a better partner in the current allocation. Since jobs monotonically improve
their position in the assignment, this leads to a contradiction.
Claim. The output x is the machine-optimal relaxed unsplit stable assignment.
That is, no machine has a better lexicographical position in any other relaxed
unsplit stable assignment than in x.
Proof. Assume that there is a relaxed unsplit stable assignment x′, where some
machines come better off than in x. To be more precise, in the symmetric differ-
ence x△x′, the best edge incident to these machines belongs to x′. When running
the reversed relaxed unsplit Gale-Shapley algorithm, there is a step when the
first such edge jm1 carries a proposal from m1 but gets rejected. Otherwise,
m1 filled up or exceeded its quota in x with only better edges than jm1. Let
us consider only this edge first and denote the feasible, but possibly unstable
relaxed allocation produced by the algorithm so far by x0.
When j refused jm1, it already had a partner m0 in x0, better than m1. Even
if there is no guarantee that jm0 ∈ x, it is sure that jm0 /∈ x′ and jm0 does
not block x′, though rankj(jm0) > rankj(jm1) for jm1 ∈ x′. It is only possible
if m0 is saturated or over-capacitated in x′ with edges better than jm0. Since
jm0 ∈ x0, x0 may not contain all of these edges, otherwise m0 is congested
in x0 beyond the level required for a relaxed unsplit assignment. During the
execution of the reversed relaxed unsplit Gale-Shapley algorithm, m0 proposed
along all of these edges and got rejected by at least one of them. This edge is
never considered again, it may not enter x later. Thus, jm1 is not the first edge
in x′ \ x that was rejected in the algorithm.
With this, we completed the constructive proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The machine-optimal relaxed unsplit stable assignment xmopt can
be computed in O(|E|) time.
3.2 Properties of the Job- and Machine-Optimal Solutions
Theorem 3. The job-optimal relaxed unsplit stable assignment xjopt is the machine-
pessimal relaxed unsplit stable assignment and vice versa, the machine-optimal
relaxed unsplit stable assignment xmopt is the job-pessimal relaxed unsplit stable
assignment.
Proof. We start with the first statement. Suppose that there is a relaxed unsplit
stable assignment x′ that is worse for some machine m than xjopt. This is only
possible if m’s best edge jm in xjopt△x′ belongs to xjopt. Since xjopt is the job-
optimal solution, jm′, j’s edge in x′ is worse than jm. But then, m is saturated
or over-capacitated in x′ with better edges than jm. We assumed that all edges
in x′ that are better than jm are also in xjopt. Thus, omitting m’s worst job
from xjopt leaves m at or over its quota.
The second half of the theorem can be proved similarly, using the reversed
Gale-Shapley algorithm. Assume that there is a relaxed unsplit stable assignment
x′ that assigns some jobs to worse machines than xmopt does. Let us denote the
set of edges preferred by any job to its allocated machine in x′ by E′. Due to
our indirect assumption, E′ contains some edges of xmopt. When running the
reversed Gale-Shapley algorithm on the instance, there is an edge jm ∈ E′ that
is the first edge in E′ carrying a proposal. Since j is not yet matched to a better
machine, it also accepts this offer. Even if jm /∈ xmopt, j’s edge in xmopt is at
least as good as m, because jobs always improve their position during the course
of the reversed Gale-Shapley algorithm. On the other hand, m cannot fulfill its
quota in xmopt with better edges than jm, simply because the proposal step
along jm took place.
Since jm /∈ x′, but j prefers jm to its edge in x′, m is saturated or over-
capacitated with better edges than jm in x′. As observed above, not all of these
edges belong to xmopt. Let us denote one of them in x′ \ xmopt by j′m. Before
proposing along jm, m submitted an offer to j′ that has been refused. The
only reason for such a refusal is that j′ has already been matched to a better
machine m′. But since j′m ∈ x′, j′m′ ∈ E′. This contradicts to our indirect
assumption that jm is the first edge in E′ that carries a proposal.
Theorem 1 also follows from the proof above.
We note that although we can compute the job-optimal and machine-optimal
relaxed unsplit stable allocations, there in general does not appear to be an ob-
vious underlying lattice structure behind relaxed unsplit solutions. As already
mentioned above, stable matchings and fractional stable allocations form a dis-
tributive lattice. In those cases, computing the meet or join of two solutions is
fairly easy. In order to reach the join of x1 and x2, all machines choose the better
edge set out of those two allocations [9]. Similarly, for meet, jobs are allowed to
chose. The example in Figure ?? illustrates that this property does not carry over
to relaxed unsplit assignments. If all jobs chose the better allocation, m3 remains
empty and j7m3 becomes blocking. Similar examples can easily be constructed
to show that choosing the worse assignment also can lead to instability.
Our ability to compute xmopt in O(|E|) time now gives us a linear-time
method for solving the (non-relaxed) unsplittable stable allocation problem (ac-
cording to our stricter notion of stability).
Lemma 1. If an instance I admits an unsplit stable assignment x, then the
machine-optimal relaxed unsplit stable assignment xmopt on the corresponding
relaxed instance I ′ is also an unsplit stable assignment on I.
Proof. Suppose the statement is false, e.g. although there is an unsplit stable
assignment x, xmopt is no unsplit stable assignment on I. This can be due to two
reasons: either the feasibility or the stability of xmopt is harmed on I. The latter
case is easier to handle. An allocation that is feasible on both instances and
stable on I ′ may not be blocked by any edge on I, since the set of unsaturated
edges is identical on both instances. The second case, namely if xmopt violates
some feasibility constraint on I, needs more care.
I and I ′ differ only in the constraints on the quota of machines. If xmopt
is infeasible on I, then there is a machine m for which xmopt(m1) > q(m1).
Regarding the unsplit stable assignment x, the inequality x(m1) ≤ q(m1) triv-
ially holds. Now we use Theorem 1 for x and xmopt that are both relaxed
unsplit stable assignments on I ′. This corollary implies that if there is a ma-
chine m1 with xmopt(m1) > x(m1), then another machine m2 exists for which
xmopt(m2) < x(m2) holds.
This machine m2 plays a crucial role in our proof. It has a lower alloca-
tion value in the machine-optimal relaxed solution xmopt than in another re-
laxed stable solution x on I. Its lexicographical position can only be better in
xmopt than in x if the best edge j2m2 in x△xmopt belongs to xmopt. Moreover,
x△xmopt also contains an edge j3m2 ∈ x, otherwise xmopt(m2) > x(m2). Nat-
urally, rankm(j2m2) < rankm(j3m2). At this point, we use the property that
xmopt(m2) < q(m2). Since m2 has free quota in xmopt and j3m2 is not a block-
ing edge, j3 must be matched to a machine better than m2 in xmopt. Thus,
there is a job that comes better off in the machine-optimal (and job-pessimal)
relaxed solution than in another relaxed stable solution. This contradiction to
Theorem 3 finishes our proof.
Lemma 1 shows that if there is an unsplit solution, it can be found in linear
time by computing the machine-optimal relaxed solution. Unfortunately, the
existence of such an unsplit assignment is not guaranteed. Our next result applies
to the case when no feasible unsplit solution can be found. In terms of congestion,
with the machine-optimal solution we come as close as possible to feasibility.
Theorem 4. Amongst all relaxed unsplit stable solutions, xmopt has the lowest
total congestion.
Proof. Let Mu denote the set of machines that remain under their quota in xmopt.
Note that
∑
m/∈Mu
xmopt(m), the total allocation value on the remaining ma-
chines clearly determines
∑
m/∈Mu
xmopt(m)− q(m), the total congestion of xmopt.
Let x be an arbitrary relaxed solution. Due to Theorem 1, the total allocation
value is minimized at xmopt. Therefore, for any relaxed unsplit stable allocation
x, the following inequalities hold:
∑
m∈M
x(m) ≥
∑
m∈M
xmopt(m)
∑
m/∈Mu
x(m) +
∑
m∈Mu
x(m) ≥
∑
m/∈Mu
xmopt(m) +
∑
m∈Mu
xmopt(m)
∑
m/∈Mu
x(m) −
∑
m/∈Mu
xmopt(m) ≥
∑
m∈Mu
xmopt(m)−
∑
m∈Mu
x(m)
∑
m/∈Mu
(x(m) − q(m))−
∑
m/∈Mu
(xmopt(m)− q(m)) ≥
∑
m∈Mu
xmopt(m)−
∑
m∈Mu
x(m)
At this point, we investigate the sign of both sides of the last inequality. The
core of our proof is to show that for each m ∈ Mu and relaxed stable solution x,
xmopt(m) ≥ x(m). This result, proved below, has two benefits. On one hand, the
term on the right hand-side of the last inequality is non-negative. Therefore, the
inequality implies that the total congestion on machines in M \Mu is minimized
at xmopt. On the other hand, no machine in Mu is over-capacitated in any relaxed
solution. Thus, the total congestion is minimized at xmopt.
Lemma 2. For every m ∈ Mu and relaxed solution x, the inequality xmopt(m) ≥
x(m) holds.
Proof. Suppose that there is a machine m ∈ Mu for which xmopt(m) < x(m) for
some relaxed solution x. Since m is unsaturated in xmopt, it is unpopular. On
the other hand, there is at least one job j for which jm ∈ x \ xmopt. As m is
unpopular in xmopt, j is allocated to a better machine in xmopt than in x. Since
xmopt is the job-pessimal solution, we derived a contradiction.
3.3 A Variant of the “Rural Hospital” Theorem
In the relaxed unsplit case, we have provided counterexamples against an exact
rural hospital theorem (e.g., where all machines have the same amount of alloca-
tion in all relaxed unsplit allocations) or even a weakened theorem stating that
all unsaturated / congested machines have the same status in all relaxed unsplit
allocations. The examples in Figure 2 also show that no similar property holds
for the jobs’ side either. Lemma 2 above however suggests an alternate variant
of “rural hospital” theorem that does hold.
Theorem 5. A machine m that is not saturated in xmopt will not be saturated
in every relaxed unsplit stable solution, and a machine m that is over-capacitated
in xjopt must at least be saturated in every relaxed unsplit stable solution.
Proof. The first part is shown by Lemma 2. For the second part, consider a
machine m that is over-capacitated in xjopt but has x(m) < q(m) in some relaxed
unsplit allocation x. Consider any job j in xjopt\x, and note that since xjopt is
job-optimal, j prefers m to its partner in x. Hence, jm blocks x.
As of the jobs’ side, Theorem 3 already guarantees that if a job is unmatched
in xjopt, then it is unmatched in all relaxed stable solutions and similarly, if it
is matched in xmopt, then it is matched in all relaxed stable solutions.
4 Rounding Algorithms
We have seen now how to compute xjopt and xmopt in linear time. We now
describe how to find potentially other relaxed unsplit solutions by “rounding”
solutions to the (fractional) stable allocation problem. For example, this could
provide a heuristic for generating relaxed unsplit solutions that are more bal-
anced in terms of fairness between the jobs and machines. Our approach is based
on augmentation around rotations, alternating cycles that are commonly used
in stable matching and allocation problems to move between different stable
solutions (see, e.g., [7,11]).
We begin with a stable allocation x with x(j) = q(j) for every job j, thanks
to the existence of a dummy machine. For each job j that is not fully assigned to
its first-choice machine, we define its refusal edge r(j) to be the worst edge jm
incident to j with x(jm) > 0. Jobs with refusal edges also have proposal edges
– namely all their edges ranked better than r(j). Recall that a machine with
incoming proposal edges is said to be popular. We call a machine dangerous if it
is over-capacitated and has zero assignment on all its incoming proposal edges.
Claim. Consider a popular machine m in some fractional stable allocation x.
Amongst all proposal edges incoming to m, at most one has positive allocation
value in x, and this positive proposal edge is ranked lower on m’s preference list
than any other edge into m with positive allocation.
Proof. Let rankm(j1m) > rankm(j2m) be proposal edges such that x(j1m) and
x(j2m) are both positive. Note that j1m blocks x, since j1 and m have worse
allocated edges in x. A similar argument implies the last part of the claim.
Our algorithm proceeds by a series of augmentations around rotations, de-
fined as follows. We start from a popular, non-dangerous machine m (if no such
machine exists, the algorithm terminates, having reached an unsplit solution).
Since m is popular and non-dangerous, it has incoming proposal edges with pos-
itive allocation, and due to the preceding claim, it must have exactly one such
edge jm. We include jm as well as j’s refusal edge jm′ in our partial rotation,
then continue building the rotation from m′ (again finding an incoming proposal
edge, etc.). We continue until we close a cycle, visiting some machine m visited
earlier (in which case we keep just the cycle as our rotation, not the edges leading
up to the cycle), or until we reach a machine m that is unpopular or dangerous,
where our rotation ends.
To enact a rotation, we increase the allocation on its proposal edges by ε and
decrease along the refusal edges by ε, where ε is chosen to be as large as possible
until either (i) a refusal edge along the rotation reaches zero allocation, or (ii)
a dangerous machine at the end of the rotation drops down to being exactly
saturated from being over-capacitated, and hence ceases to be dangerous. We
call case (i) a “regular” augmentation. This concludes the algorithm description.
Claim. The algorithm terminates after O(|E|) augmentations.
Proof. Jobs remain fully allocated during the whole procedure, and their lexico-
graphical positions never worsen. With every regular augmentation, some edge
stops being a refusal edge, and will never again be increased or serve as a proposal
or refusal edge. We can therefore have at most O(|E|) regular augmentations.
Furthermore, a machine can only become dangerous if one of its incoming re-
fusal pointers reaches zero allocation, so the number of newly-created dangerous
machines over the entire algorithm is bounded by |E|. Hence, the number of
non-regular augmentations is at most O(|M |+ |E|) = O(|E|).
Claim. The final allocation x is a feasible relaxed unsplit assignment.
Proof. Since we start with a feasible assignment and jobs never lose or gain
allocation, the quota condition on jobs cannot be harmed. If there is any edge
jm with 0 < x(jm) < q(j), then j has at least two positive edges, the better one
must be a positive proposal edge. This contradicts the termination condition,
and hence x is unsplit.
We now show that deleting the worst job from each machine results in an
allocation strictly below the machine’s quota. It is clearly true at the beginning,
where no machine is over-capacitated (since x starts out as a feasible stable
allocation). The only case when x(m) increases is when m is the first machine
on a rotation. As such, m has a positive proposal edge jm, which is also its worst
allocated edge, due to our earlier claim.
– If m is not over-capacitated when choosing the rotation, then even if x(jm)
rises as high as q(j), this increases x(m) by strictly less than q(j). Thus,
deleting jm, the worst allocated edge of m, guarantees that x(m) sinks
under q(m).
– If m is saturated or over-capacitated when choosing the rotation, then jm
would have been the best proposal edge of m earlier, when x(m) was not
greater than q(m). Thus, assigning j entirely to m does not harm the relaxed
quota condition. Let us consider the last step as x(m) exceeded q(m). Again,
m was the starting vertex of an augmenting path, having a positive proposal
edge. If it was jm, our claim is proved. Otherwise m became over-capacitated
while x(jm) was zero, and then increased the allocation on jm. But between
those two operations, m had to become dangerous, because it switched its
best proposal edge to jm. Dangerous machines never start alternating paths.
Thus, we have a contradiction to the fact that we considered the last step
when x(m) exceeded q(m).
Claim. The final allocation x is stable.
Proof. Suppose some edges block x. Since we started with a stable allocation,
there was a step during the execution of the algorithm when the first edge
jm became blocking. Before this step, either j or m was saturated or over-
capacitated with better edges than jm. The change can be due to two reasons:
1. j gained allocation on an edge worse than jm, or
2. m gained allocation on an edge worse than jm.
As already mentioned, j’s lexicographical position never worsens: rankj(p) >
rankj(r(j)) always holds. The second event also may not occur, because machines
always play their best response strategy. An edge jm that becomes blocking
when allocation is increased on an edge worse than it, was already a proposal
edge before. Thus, m would have chosen jm, or an edge better than jm to add
it to the augmenting path.
Since each augmentation requires O(|V |) time and there are O(|E|) augmen-
tations, our rounding algorithm runs in O(|E||V |) total time. If desired, dynamic
tree data structures can be used (much like in [7]) to augment in O(log |V |) time,
bringing the total time down to just O(|E| log |V |).
Although jobs improve their lexicographical position in each rotation, the
output of the algorithm is not necessarily xjopt. In fact, even xmopt can be reached
via this approach. Ideally, this approach can serve as a heuristic to generate many
other relaxed unsplit stable allocations, if run from a variety of different initial
stable solutions x.
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